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DILEMMAS OF PLEADING IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS
by
Arthur L. Moller*

"'-r HE main purpose of the Bankruptcy Act is that the assets of an in-

.solvent person who has committed an act or acts of bankruptcy
within four months before the filing of an involuntary petition against
him, shall be equally distributed among his creditors. It cannot be that
Congress intended that this purpose should be defeated by a resort to technicalities in pleading." This sensible, if somewhat idealistic, statement was
enunciated by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in In re Harris.'
Would that it were so!
The Supreme Court was originally given the authority to make rules
and forms for bankruptcy proceedings by section 30 of the Bankruptcy
Act.' Of the many adversary proceedings which take place in ordinary
bankruptcy cases, the Court has seen fit to promulgate official forms for
only two: the involuntary petition in bankruptcy (Official Form No. 5)'
and specifications of objection to discharge (Official Form No. 44).' In
all other adversary areas-turnovers, contests of claims, reclamations,
counterclaims, etc.-the Court's silence has left the bankruptcy courts free
to apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,' and in these areas questions
regarding sufficiency of pleadings arise no more frequently than in other
civil cases. Unfortunately such is not the case with regard to involuntary
petitions and specifications of objection to discharge, where questions of
the sufficiency of pleadings often occur.
After the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,' the Supreme Court revised the general orders and forms for bankruptcy proceedings. However, Official Forms Nos. 5 and 44 were left in essentially the
same form and language as had been adopted in 1898. And during the thirty years of the Civil Rules, although the Supreme Court has further
changed various of the General Orders to conform more nearly to the
Rules, and although Congress has made compensating amendments to
*B.A., LL.B., University of Texas. Referee in Bankruptcy, Houston, Texas; revising editor,
volumes 7 and 7A, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (14th ed. 1967).
' 299 F. 395, 400 (lst Cir. 1924).
'Bankruptcy Act § 30, 11 U.S.C.A. § 53 (1968). Throughout this Article, section numbers referred to are those of the Bankruptcy Act. These are not the same as the section numbers in title
11 of the United States Code. For reasons known only to itself, Congress has never seen fit to make
these numbers coincide. Section 30 reads: "All necessary rules, forms, and orders as to procedure
for carrying the provisions of this title into force and effect shall be prescribed, and may be amended from time to time, by the Supreme Court." This section was repealed in 1964, but the prior
rules, forms, and orders prescribed under the authority of § 30 have been preserved.
s305 U.S. 741 (1939); 11 U.S.C. App. at 2035 (1964).
4305 U.S. 764 (1939); 11 U.S.C. App. at 2047 (1964).
' General Order 37 provides: "In proceedings under the Act the Rules of Civil Procedure for
the District Courts of the United States shall, in so far as they are not inconsistent with the Act
or with these general orders, be followed as nearly as may be. But the court may shorten the limitations of time prescribed so as to expedite hearings, and may otherwise modify the rules for the
preparation or hearing of any particular proceeding." 305 U.S. 698 (1939); 11 U.S.C. App,. at
2014 (1964).
' The rewritten orders and forms were put into effect by the Court's order dated January 16,
1939. 305 U.S. 681-785 (1939).
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many of the procedural sections of the Bankruptcy Act, the Supreme
Court has ignored the frequency with which the sufficiency of the allegations in involuntary petitions and specifications of objection to discharge
consume the time and attention of the courts. Despite the wild confusion
among the lower courts in the many opinions dealing with the subject, the
Supreme Court has granted no writs and has left the two offending official
forms unchanged on the books.
In 1964 Congress repealed section 30 of the Bankruptcy Act and enacted
Public Law 88-623,' which gave the Supreme Court power to prescribe by
general rules the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions and the
practice and procedure under the Bankruptcy Act. After this enactment,
the Supreme Court's Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules, long in
existence but not noticeably active during the past decade, was inspired
with a new mission in life and began meeting with some regularity. In
typical Advisory Committee fashion, its approach to the problem and its
actions are more closely guarded than matters of national security. The
last reports of its progress consist of only these cryptic items: "Judge Mars
stated further that the Advisory Committees on Rules of Bankruptcy and
Rules of Evidence are continuing intensive work on their tasks of preparing comprehensive drafts on rules in their respective fields. Much work
remains to be done before drafts will be ready for submission to the bench
and bar.' "[These Committees] are continuing intensive work.' "[These
Committees] are carrying on intensive work with frequent committee
meetings but neither committee is yet ready to make a report.''1°
It is apparent from these reports that bench and bar can expect to endure several more years of confusion regarding pleadings in bankruptcy
proceedings. This Article is intended as a warning, and perhaps as an aid,
to the bankruptcy practitioner, regular or occasional, in the drafting of
pleadings and as a reminder to the Advisory Committee that there is at
least one important unresolved problem which unquestionably merits its
attention.
I.

INVOLUNTARY

PETITIONS

Invoking the power of the bankruptcy court, from the standpoint of
pleading, should not be difficult. The basic allegations are (1) that the
debtor is a person" against whom an involuntary petition can be filed, and
who owes debts of $1,000 or more; (2) that venue lies in the court;"
(3) that the three petitioning creditors (or one petitioning creditor if the
alleged bankrupt has less than twelve creditors) have provable claims
amounting in the aggregate to $500 or more; I" and (4) that the alleged
'28 U.S.C.A. § 2075 (1967). See also note 2 supra.
'JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS, March 1967, at 23.

'Id., September 1967, at 69.
"Id., March 1968. at 16.
"See Bankruptcy Act § 1(23), 11 U.S.C.A. § 1(23) (1966).
"See Bankruptcy Act § 4b, 11 U.S.C.A. S 22(b) (1966).
"See Bankruptcy Act § 2a(1), 11 U.S.C.A. S 1la(1) (1966).
4
' See Bankruptcy Act § 59b, 11 U.S.C.A. § 95b (1968).
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bankrupt has committed an act of bankruptcy"5 within four months of the
filing of the petition.
The whole thing sounds simple, as indeed it should be and no doubt
would be if the courts could agree upon the extent to which Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applies in bankruptcy proceedings. Many
of the various circuit cases sound as if the judges have read no further than
the second line in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81 (a) (1), which reads:
"[These rules] do not apply in proceedings in bankruptcy . .." However, there is an important exception which seems to have eluded them.
Rule 81 (a) (1) continues: "except so far as they may be made applicable
thereto by rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States."
One problem in determining the extent to which the "[bankruptcy]
rules promulgated by the Supreme Court" make Federal Rule 8 applicable
to bankruptcy proceedings lies in the difficulty of discovering what the
bankruptcy rules are. For some strange reason the Supreme Court designated the bankruptcy rules General Orders, a term few general practitioners seem to recognize. Consequently, the General Orders have lain buried
in the mysterious depths of title 11 of the United States Code for all these
years of their existence. The confusion is now further compounded by the
fact that the publisher of the United States Code Annotated recently issued
a new volume of title 11-sans section 30, rules, and forms-and only a
well-informed lawyer who knew and understood the terms of Public Law
88-623"' will have retained the old volume in which the General Orders
and Official Forms were carried.
In addition to the difficulty of finding the general orders, a more serious
problem is created by the Supreme Court's ambiguous action with regard
to them. By General Order 37,17 as amended shortly after the effective date
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court provided that
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "shall . . . be followed as nearly as
may be." However, at the same time the Court left Official Form No. 5 as
it originally had been promulgated and, still worse, did nothing about
General Order 38,18 which requires the use of forms promulgated by the
Court. Paragraph 4 of Form 5, which contains the allegation of an act of
bankruptcy, reads: "Within four months next preceding the filing of this
committed an act of bankpetition, the said
ruptcy, in that he did heretofore, to wit, on the-- day of
19-,
5
" Bankruptcy Act § 3a, 11 U.S.C.A. § 21a (1966) defines the acts of bankruptcy. These are

that the debtor (1) made a transfer of his property with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his
creditors, or made a transfer which is fraudulent as to his creditors under provisions of the Act;
(2) preferred one creditor over the others by payment on an antecedent debt; (3) permitted a
creditor to obtain a judicial lien upon any of his property which he has not vacated within thirty
days; (4) executed a general assignment for the benefit of his creditors; (5) had a receiver appointed to take charge of his property; or (6) admitted in writing his inability to pay his debts
and his willingness to be adjudicated a bankrupt.
1628 U.S.C.A. § 2075
1 Note 5 supra.

(1967).

See note 2 supra.

"This general order provides: "The several forms annexed to these general orders shall be observed and used, with such alterations as may be necessary to suit the circumstances of any particular case." 305 U.S. 699 (1939); 11 U.S.C. App. at 2015 (1964).
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This is a striking contrast to the sample forms appended to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and therein lies the trap for the attorney who
has had those Rules drummed into him since law school days. The Rulesoriented attorney will plead as he has been taught, only to fall victim to
time-consuming attacks on his pleadings as being fatally defective because
of the inadequacy of the allegations.
Alleged bankrupts take advantage of technical shortcomings in the
pleadings in order to gain time, and also in the hope of obtaining dismissal
of the petition. There are at least two important reasons why dismissal of
an involuntary petition in bankruptcy can be particularly damaging to
creditors. First, such a dismissal is far more serious than dismissal of a civil
suit because almost invariably it is fatal to the petitioner's cause. Under
the Bankruptcy Act an essential condition for adjudication is that an act
of bankruptcy shall have occurred within four months prior to the filing
of the petition."9 This time period is quite short, and because a dismissal, if
granted, usually occurs after the four months period has passed, a subsequent petition may be filed only if another act of bankruptcy has occurred
within the proper time and has been discovered by the petitioner within
that limited time. A second reason that sustaining the original involuntary
petition is desirable is that once a single act of bankruptcy has occurred
and the petition has been timely filed with adequate allegations, the power
of the trustee to reach back and unscramble transactions which are vulnerable under specific sections of the Act (e.g., sections 60, 67, 70)0 is not

restricted to those transactions that occurred within the four months filing
period. 1 Equally important, this power is not restricted to those specific
transactions alleged in the involuntary petition. A single act of bankruptcy
triggers the whole thing-even an act of bankruptcy which is quite insignificant in terms of dollars or in relation to other suspect transactions
not alleged in the involuntary petition.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 (e) provides that each averment of a
pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct; and Rule 8 (a) (2)" s requires
merely "a short and plain statement." It should be noted especially that
Rule 8 does not require the pleading of facts, as distinguished from conclusions of law. The simplicity of the standard required of a pleading under

the Civil Rules has been set forth clearly by the Supreme Court in Conley
v. Gibson." There the Court reiterated that the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-

cedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which
he bases his claim. "To the contrary," the Court noted, "all the Rules require is a 'short plain statement of the claim' that will give the defendant
fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it
19See note 15 supra.
0

" Bankruptcy Act §§ 60, 67, 70, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 96 (1968), 107, 110 (1967).
1 Some transactions are, of course, vulnerable for four months only. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act
660, 11 U.S.C.A. § 96 (1968). The trustee's power under another section of the Act is not so restricted: "Section 70(e)(1) prescribes no conditions or time limits within which transactions are
deemed voidable. It merely incorporates the applicable state or federal law in this regard. Consequently the four-month and one-year limitations established in §§ 60 and 67 are inapplicable in
a suit under § 70e." 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 70.71 (14th ed. 1967).
2
FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (2).
23355 U.S. 41 (1957).
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rests."2 This simplified "notice pleading" is possible only because of the
liberal opportunity for discovery and other pre-trial procedures established
by the Rules to disclose precisely the basis of both claim and defense and
to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues. As the Court emphasized, "The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of
skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and
accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper
decision on the merits.'
Even in civil cases it has been quite difficult for courts to maintain this
"positive rule simply expressed but which must constantly resist erosion
from the subtle influence of the local state practice on sufficiency of
pleadings,"" and in bankruptcy cases the inertia and habit of old and outmoded fact pleading simply have never been overcome. An involuntary petition which meets every requirement of the Civil Rules may still be met
with the response from some courts that it "fails to state specific facts
relied upon to constitute a preferential transfer" and that "the allegations
should have included the date of the alleged transfer, a description of the
property transferred, and a statement that it was made in satisfaction of
an antecedent debt."27 Often, involuntary petitions are challenged as being
so "fatally defective" as to deprive the bankruptcy court of jurisdiction,"
and a number of the cases have used the term "jurisdictional facts" as a
basis for a particular procedural ruling."' On this specious basis petitioning
creditors have been denied the right to amend, and their petitions have
been dismissed. Recently, however, several courts have trended away from
the "jurisdictional facts" concept. The Eighth Circuit put such a contention in proper perspective: "This contention overlooks the fact that the
Congress, not the pleadings, vests the District Court with the power or
right to act in bankruptcy proceedings. In the instant case, the District
Court had jurisdiction of the subject matter by virtue of the federal bankruptcy act. . . . A defective petition in bankruptcy presents no different
problem from a defective complaint generally. It does not deprive the
court of jurisdiction and is subject to amendment."' Similarly, the First,2
Second,"2 Third," Fifth," and Seventh' Circuits have recognized that the
24 Id. at 47.

'5 Id. at 48.
21 Judge John R. Brown in Georgia Jewelers, Inc. v. Bulova Watch Co., 302 F.2d 362, 366
(5th Cir. 1962); cf. Millet v. Godchaux Sugars, Inc., 241 F.2d 264, 265 (5th Cir. 1957).
21In re Timberline Lodge, 139 F. Supp. 13, 14 (D. Ore. 1955).
'Typical of the older cases is In re Fuller, 15 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1926), where the court dismissed a petition alleging an act of bankruptcy substantially in the language of the statute. "A
petitioning creditor must show that he has challenged the act of bankruptcy in season, and it is
impossible to know whether he has, until he identifies what act he means." Id. at 295. The court
refused to consider that this was merely a matter of form and entered an outright dismissal without leave to amend.
2 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 5 18.05 (14th ed. 1967).
'*Commercial Credit Corp. v. Skutt, 341 F.2d 177, 180 (8th Cir. 1965).
3' Harney Shoes, Inc. v. National Fabrics & Finishing Co., 44 F.2d 517 (1st Cir. 1930).
2Minkoff v. Steven Jrs., Inc., 260 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1958); South Suburban Safeway Lines,
Inc. v. Carcards, Inc., 256 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1958).
"Kay
v. Federal Rubber Co., 46 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1930).
4
1 Abramson v. Boedeker, 379 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1967).
'Bixby v. First Nat'l Bank, 250 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1957).
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jurisdiction of the court is invoked by pleading in the words of the statute
and have allowed amendment of the pleadings to correct the defects of
generality.
Not long after the effective date of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
their effect on bankruptcy pleadings began to register in some areas. As
early as 1942, in the case of Glint Factors, Inc. v. Schnapp, the Second
Circuit relied upon the provision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 (c)
that "Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted
to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the
date of the original pleading," as authority for allowing the amendment
of a defective allegation of an act of bankruptcy.' The court considered
that this rule had become effective in bankruptcy by virtue of General
Order 3737 and had resulted in a liberalization of the former rule which
9
denied the right to amend the petition."9 In Glint Factors"
the original petition had alleged the transfer to relatives of a sum in excess of $2,300.
This, the court held, was specific enough to enable the district judge to
conclude that the amendment setting forth the transfer of $2,2 50 in named
amounts to named relatives arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence attempted to be set forth in the original petition. Both the original
petition and the amendment dealt with the manner by which the alleged
bankrupt had transferred to relatives money she had received from the
petitioning creditor; thus the original petition had given adequate notice

to the alleged bankrupt of the petitioning creditor's claim.
Hopeful though this purported effort to conform. to the Civil Rules may
have been, the court destroyed the optimism which it had engendered when
it went on to say: "We do not mean to be understood that a petition alleging such acts of bankruptcy merely in the words of the statute may be
made good by amendment which will relate back to the date of the petition. There must be enough more to show that the pleader did know, and
attempted to state, some definite conduct, transaction, or occurrence. ' ' 0
Inadvertent failure to allege the act of bankruptcy with sufficient particularity would now be ground for amendment under Rule 15 (c), the court
conceded, "though failure to plead the pertinent facts adequately merely
because they are not known will have the same result as before."41
This imposition of a subjective test for amendment surely was never intended by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 (c) .' Application of such a
test would deprive the plaintiff in a civil case of the use of information
gained through discovery. There is even less justification for its application
in bankruptcy cases where, in addition to the discovery provisions of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure4' there are available the inquisitory pro'9

126 F.2d 207, 209 (2d Cir. 1942).

17

See note 5 supra.

"9Inre

Fuller, 15 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1926).
89126 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1942).
Id. at 209.
41 Id.
4

423

J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 15.15(1)" (2d ed. 1968).

41See Bankruptcy Act § 21k, 11 U.S.C. § 44k (1964).
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cedures provided by sections 3d" and 21 a" of the Bankruptcy Act. Section
3d would be entirely frustrated, and section 21a materially frustrated,
should the petitioning creditors be barred from using information so
learned to meet the demands of a motion to dismiss or a motion for more
definite statement." The Fifth Circuit has flatly rejected a subjective test,
stating: "This is really but another facet of the argument we initially rejected that there is somehow something fatally defective if the creditors at
the time of the filing of the initial petition in bankruptcy do not have all
of the factual information they might later learn. To the extent that older
decisions might affirm any such approach, they have long since lost their
vitality. Bankruptcy is indeed a specialized branch of law and jurisdiction,
but save in those areas still reserved to specialized treatment under General
Order 37 . . . it is otherwise subject to the same approach as other civil
litigation. The essence of that system, reflected by the Civil Rules, is that
pleadings seldom are now the means by which the claim is to be determined, or notice given to the adversary as to what facts might be asserted. That is the function of discovery .... The very purpose of pretrial
depositions, requests for admissions, written interrogatories, notice to produce documents, etc., is to obtain evidence not presently available to support a claim or defense asserted in good faith.'" 7
In a recent case, Abramson v. Boedeker,"' the Fifth Circuit took the last
giant stride in its unrelenting effort to reconcile the apparent differences
between Official Form No. 5 and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In
Abramson Chief Judge Brown stated: "[W]hether the allegations of the
involuntary petition are adequate is essentially a question of procedure.
Through General Order 37 this brings directly into play the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 'in so far as they are not inconsistent with the Act or
with [the] general orders.' . . . Except that § 18c [of the Bankruptcy
Act]" requires that 'petitions for both voluntary and involuntary bankruptcy shall be verified under oath,' 2 Collier 5 18.36, nothing in General
Order 5 prescribing the content and form of the petition nor in the official
forms, see General Order 38, is inconsistent with F.R. Civ. P. 8(a) (2)
"Bankruptcy Act § 3d, 11 U.S.C. S 21d (1964). This section requires a person against whom
a petition has been filed to appear with his books, papers, and accounts and to submit to an examination.
'Bankruptcy Act § 21a, 11 U.S.C. 44a (1964). This section allows the court, subject to
certain exceptions and in response to application of any offcer, bankrupt, or creditor, to order any
designated person, including the bankrupt, to be examined concerning the acts, conduct, or property
of a bankrupt.
4 In an old case (1914) the Fifth Circuit held that a § 21a examination could not be used to
obtain evidence to establish insolvency or the act or acts of bankruptcy alleged by the petitioning
creditors. Rawlins v. Hall-Epps Clothing Co., 217 F. 884 (5th Cir. 1914). The case has been cited
frequently, and quite recently, as authority for this proposition. But the Fifth Circuit itself has
abandoned this view and has expressly overruled Rawlins. Georgia Jewelers, Inc. v. Bulova Watch
Co., 302 F.2d 362, 368 (5th Cir. 1962). Certainly the court's present view is to be preferred.
47Georgia Jewelers, Inc. v. Bulova Watch Co., 302 F.2d 362, 368 (5th Cir. 1962).
4' 379 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1967).
"Judge John R. Brown, Chief Judge of the Fifth Circuit, wrote the Court's opinions in
Abramson and Georgia Jewelers, which are relied upon so heavily in this Article. These and the
opinions in American Mannex Corp. v. Huffstutler, 329 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1964) and South
Falls Corp. v. Rochelle, 329 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1964), some of the better bankruptcy opinions
in recent decades, have come from this fine intellectual.
"°Bankruptcy Act § 18c, 11 U.S.C. § 41c (1964).
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which requires merely a 'short and plain statement,' the standard under
8 (e) being that each '. . . averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise,
and direct.' See 2 Collier 5 18.09[2.2], citing 2 Moore, Federal Practice,
5 8.12, it should 'be noted that . . . [Rule 8 (a) (2)] does not require the
pleading of facts as distinguished from conclusions of law.' There is no
reason, therefore, why the involuntary petition should not be read with
all of the liberality of the usual civil complaint." 1
Opponents of the liberality of this most recent pronouncement from the
Fifth Circuit can find some faint support in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9 (b), at least insofar as allegations of the first act of bankruptcy"
involving actual fraud (as distinguished from fraud presumed in law) are
concerned. In pertinent part Rule 9 (b) provides that: "In all averments
of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall
be stated with particularity." This requirement must, however, be harmonized with the general directives of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
8 (a) and 8 (e) that the pleadings should contain "a short and plain state-

ment of the claim" and that each averment should be "simple, concise, and
direct." Rule 9 (b) does not require nor make legitimate the pleading of
detailed evidentiary matter, 3 and it does not support the factual detail required by so many of the bankruptcy cases, both those alleging fraud and
those alleging one of the other acts of bankruptcy. It is interesting to note
that none of the bankruptcy cases have relied upon Rule 9 (b) to support
the requirement of detailed factual pleading. Instead, all have treated the
requirement as something inherent in bankruptcy jurisprudence and apparently have sought no support for it on the outside.
It should be observed that there is no rule in any circuit which would
prevent an allegation in the amended petition of a totally new and different act of bankruptcy which occurred within four months of the date of
the filing of the amended petition. Here, of course, there is no problem of
attempting to relate this newly alleged act of bankruptcy back to the date
of the filing of the original petition. In this situation, however, if adjudication does follow, the trustee takes title to the bankrupt's property as of the
date of the original petition," and he may recover property transferred by
the bankrupt within four months" prior to the filing of the original petition. And this is so even though the act of bankruptcy alleged in the
amended petition may have occurred after the filing of the original petition."

II.

SPECIFICATIONS OF OBJECTION TO DISCHARGE

A discharge is defined as the release of a bankrupt from all of his debts
5' 379 F.2d at 745.
5 See note 1
supra.

"See

2A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 9.03, at 1930 (2d ed.
" International Bank v. Sherman, 101 U.S. 403 (1879).

1968).

55 Or longer; see note 21 supra.
56 International Bank v. Sherman, 101 U.S. 403

(1879);

2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

" 18.26

(14th ed. 1967). See also Abramson v. Boedeker, 379 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1967). The facts are
stated in an earlier opinion, In re Casco Chem. Co., 335 F.2d 645, 646-48 (5th Cir. 1964).
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which are provable in bankruptcy, other than those excepted by the Bankruptcy Act.57 While the primary purpose of the Bankruptcy Act is the col-

lection and distribution of the debtor's estate to his creditors, the discharge of the bankrupt is a major, if secondary, purpose designed to give

the honest debtor an opportunity to re-establish himself in the business
community.

Congress did not intend that a discharge should be available to a dishonest debtor. To this end it has vested in the bankruptcy court which has

jurisdiction over the bankruptcy proceeding the jurisdiction to grant or

deny a discharge. 8 Section 14b of the Act 9 sets out the discharge proce-

dure. The court must fix a date by which all objections to discharge must
be filed. The general policy of the law seems to be that the bankrupt shall
have his discharge as promptly as is feasible. Nevertheless the creditors and
the trustee should have adequate opportunity to examine the bankrupt, to
°
conduct further investigation into his affairs if the need is indicated, and
to prepare any objections they may have. It is for this reason that the date
to be fixed for the filing of objections must be no less than thirty days after
the first meeting of creditors. The court is given authority to extend such
"
time, sua sponte, or upon the motion of an interested party.
The grounds for objecting to a discharge are set out in section 14c of
the Act. " These statutory grounds are exclusive, and unless one of these
grounds has been timely specified and is proved, the discharge must be
granted. Other conduct on the part of the bankrupt, no matter how outrageous or reprehensible, will not warrant denial of the discharge."' Failure
to recognize this fact has resulted in the filing of irate but immaterial objections, which in one case were met with this sizzling response from the
court:

If counsel preparing these objections had read the bankruptcy statute, or
only consulted the section relating to discharges, he could not have failed to
note that this section points out only two grounds [prior to the amendment
of 19031 as justifying withholding discharge, and commands the court to
grant discharge unless one of these two grounds is proven. He could scarcely
fail to notice, if that section be now consulted by him, that the matters at-

" See Bankruptcy Act § 1(15), 11 U.S.C. S 1(15) (1964). Debts not affected by discharge
are enumerated in Bankruptcy Act § 17, 11 U.S.C.A. § 35 (Supp. 1967).
"Bankruptcy Act § 2a(12), 11 U.S.C.A. § 11a(12) (1966).
"Bankruptcy Act § 14b, 11 U.S.C.A. § 32b (1967).
0
" Bankruptcy Act § 21a, 11 U.S.C. § 44a (1964) authorizes the calling as a witness any person who can shed any light upon the "acts, conduct, or property" of the bankrupt.
"See Bankruptcy Act § 14b, 11 U.S.C.A. § 32b (1967).
6 The grounds set out in Bankruptcy Act § 14c, 11 U.S.C.A. § 32c (1967) are that the bankrupt (1) has committed an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 152; (2) has destroyed, concealed, or failed
to keep or preserve books of account or records from which his financial condition and business
transactions might be ascertained; (3) has obtained for his business money or property on credit or
as an extension or renewal of credit by making or publishing a materially false statement in writing
respecting his financial condition; (4) at any time subsequent to twelve months preceding the filing
of the petition in bankruptcy has transferred, removed, destroyed, or concealed any of his property
with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors; (5) has been granted a discharge in a proceeding under the Act commenced within six years prior to the filing of this petition; (6) in the
course of the proceeding has refused to obey any lawful order of, or to answer any material question approved by, the court; (7) has failed to explain satisfactorily any losses of assets or deficiency of assets to meet his liabilities; or (8) has failed to pay the filing fees required to be paid
by the Act.
63 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 5 14.07(1) (14th ed. 1967).
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tempted (as we assume) to be stated by him are not embraced in either of
these grounds."
Under the provisions of the Act and General Order 32" as they existed
before 1938, the courts felt that it was important to grant the bankrupt a
discharge almost immediately, and it was difficult to obtain an extension of
time for filing objections. This resulted in hasty preparation of specifications of objection which, for lack of information because of incomplete examination of the bankrupt, were often stated only in the language of the
statute. Such specifications usually were dismissed outright." This trend
caused Congress to re-examine the mechanics of the discharge procedure.
Section 14b of the Act 6 7 was rewritten in 1938 to express more clearly congressional intent regarding the time when further opportunity to file objections to discharge should be cut off. The following sentence was written
into the Act:
If the examination of the bankrupt concerning his acts, conduct, and property has not or will not be completed within the time fixed for the filing of
objections to the discharge the court may, upon its own motion or upon motion of the receiver, trustee, a creditor, or any other party in interest or for
other cause, extend the time for filing such objections.
In order to make entirely clear its policy against permitting an unethical
bankrupt to obtain a discharge, Congress at the same time added section
14d" to the Act, providing that when requested by the court the United
States attorney "or such other attorney as the Attorney General may designate" shall examine into the acts and conduct of the bankrupt and, if
satisfied that probable grounds exist for a denial of the discharge and that
the public interest so warrants, shall oppose the discharge."
Under section 14b 0 as presently cast, it is not contemplated that the
time for filing objections to discharge shall be cut off until the bankrupt
has been fully examined, and any investigation into his affairs through the
questioning of others is completed. Accordingly the objector should be fully apprised of the grounds which probably can be sustained before he has
to file any objections. It is obvious, then, that a poorly-drafted specification
is filed out of either inadvertence or failure to understand the difference between the specificity of pleading which has been required by many courts
in these matters and the less stringent requirements for pleadings under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A substantial part of the misunderstanding is attributable to General Order 32 and the official form. This
General Order provides: "Any person opposing a discharge shall, on or be4lin re Frice, 96 F. 611, 613 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1899).
15305 U.S. 696 (1939); 11 U.S.C. App. at 2013 (1964).
"E.g., In re Karp, 11 F. Supp. 129 (D. Conn. 1935).
" Bankruptcy Act § 14b, I1 U.S.C.A. 5 32b (1967).
"Bankruptcy Act § 14d, 11 U.S.C. 5 32d (1964).
"In some instances the United States Attorney's investigation will reveal convincing evidence
that a violation of one of the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 152 has occurred but that there is not
sufficient evidence to sustain the prosecution's burden of proof (beyond a reasonable doubt) in a
criminal proceeding. In this situation a specification of objection to discharge may be filed. This is
a civil proceeding, and the burden of proof is the usual one of preponderance of the evidence.
"°Bankruptcy Act § 14b, 11 U.S.C.A. § 32b (1967).
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fore the time fixed for the filing of objections to the discharge, file a specification in writing of the grounds of his opposition."'"
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has left Official Form No. 44 essentially unchanged from its 1898 language: "
...does hereby oppose the granting to the bankrupt of a discharge from
his debts, and specifies the following grounds of objection: [Here specify
in separately numbered paragraphs the grounds of objection.]" In keeping with this form, a number of cases,"2 relying on pre-Civil Rules cases,
have required a pleading of factual detail which is diametrically opposed to
the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding sufficiency of pleadings. For example, In re Turdo73 affirmed an outright dismissal of specifications without leave to amend. There the court held that
In re Epstein,74 a 1917 case, was directly in point and, in reliance upon it,
ruled that a bare recital in the specifications that the bankrupt had obtained money or property on credit by making a materially false financial
statement in writing respecting his financial condition was insufficient if
used without further language to show to whom the statements were made,
from whom the goods were obtained, or what the false statements were.
The single area in which the cases have relied upon the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is that of amendments to the objections. Here the cases
have recognized that the specification of objection is a pleading, and therefore Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 (a), made applicable by General
Order 37, would suggest that leave to amend "be freely given when justice so requires." '
Some of the statutory grounds of objection to discharge contain elements
suggesting fraud," and as to these, support for more detailed pleading can
be found in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9 (b). However, as in the instance of similar counts in the involuntary petition, the cases do not rely
on Rule 9(b). Certainly Rule 9 lends no support to the requirement of
the evidentiary detail which is imposed by so many of the cases.
The cases have ignored the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and for
support in their results have resorted to cases dealing with common law
pleadings, which were concerned only with how the parties had formulated
the issues in the pleadings and gave no thought whatever to fair notice.
These cases proceeded on the theory that the pleadings had to contain
factual detail and that any variance in proof from those details must result
in prejudice. "But this rests on the untenable ground that the parties know
nothing of the matter in litigation except what has been stated in the
pleading."" In objections to discharge, it is the bankrupt's conduct which
is under attack; he should know better than anyone what he has done.
71See note 65 supra.
7 Many of the cases are collected in 7 REMINGTON ON BANKRUPTCY 310-37

(6th ed. 1955).
Most of these decisions are quite old, but so are the form and the theory of pleading which they
represent.
7399 F. Supp. 188 (D.N.J. 1951).
74248 F. Supp. 191 (S.D. Fla. 1917).
" In re Schmerel, 120 F. Supp. 899 (D.N.J. 1954). To the same effect is In re Black & White
Cab Co., 35 F. Supp. 832 (W.D. Mo. 1940).
70E.g., the first, third and fourth grounds. See note 62 supra.
77
2A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 8.03, at 1614 (2d ed. 1968).
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There is no logic whatever to support the application of the archaic rules
of pleading suggested by Official Form No. 44 and blindly followed by
the courts in these matters. As long as a pleading imparts fair notice to
the adversary, it should be sufficient; there is no valid reason for a standard
of pleading in objections to discharge which requires more.
III. CONCLUSION

There simply is no justification for the long neglect by the Supreme
Court of the impossible situation regarding pleadings in the two bankruptcy areas treated in this Article. This situation was bad enough before
1938; since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it has
been intolerable.
The newly adopted Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure are an encouraging sign that there is some effort to do away with some of the idiosyncrasies of bankruptcy procedure. That Advisory Committee considered sec-

tion 25 of the Bankruptcy Act a "potential trap for the uninitiated" and
has now established in Appellate Rule 4 a time for filing notice of appeal
which will apply uniformly to all civil cases."8 It is to be hoped that the
Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules is of the same mind and will
recommend to the Supreme Court the abolition of all pleading and other
procedural variances in adversary proceedings in bankruptcy cases."
Whatever the Committee may do, it is obvious that the new Bankruptcy Rules will not take effect for a number of years." In an effort to
make the wait a bit less strenuous, the Supreme Court would be well advised to abrogate Official Forms Nos. 5 and 44 immediately.

"SThis repeal of § 25 of the Bankruptcy Act was made possible by Public Law 88-623, codified as 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1967).
" Heretofore I have advocated a total merger of bankruptcy with the other jurisdictions of
the United States District Court. See 39 REF. J. 72 (1965). 1 have not retreated from this stand.
However, the address to the Referees' Conference in October 1965 by Professor Frank R. Kennedy,
Reporter for the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules, implied strongly that the Committee
has taken a different approach to its task.
sA preliminary draft of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure was submitted to the bench
and bar in March 1964. The final Rules were adopted by the Supreme Court on December 4, 1967,
and will not be effective until July 1, 1968, four years and three months after the publication of
the preliminary draft. I do not represent this time lag as representative of the course of all rules;
I merely cite it as an example.

